From 1330606ca1ea4d9296fc97ed320735075293e2f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 16:49:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] dtls: Fix adaptation to first ClientHello For each received ClientHello fragment, check that its epoch is zero and update the record-level sequence number. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_msg.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 0799a0067e..87d64788bd 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -2991,16 +2991,17 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl_buffering_shift_slots(ssl, recv_msg_seq); ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = recv_msg_seq; ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = recv_msg_seq; - - /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ - if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - - memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, - sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); } + + /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ + if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); + } else if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { /* In case of a post-handshake ClientHello that initiates a * renegotiation check that the handshake message sequence