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https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
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@@ -333,6 +333,16 @@
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* dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
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* and ciphers instead.
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*
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* \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
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* enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
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* the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
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* alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
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* the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
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* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
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* implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
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* (and for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() too if backward compatibility is
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* desirable).
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*
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*/
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//#define MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
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//#define MBEDTLS_MD4_PROCESS_ALT
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@@ -107,6 +107,20 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
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* Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
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* Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
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*
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*
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* \warning Since the output of the internal RNG is always the same for
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* the same key and message, this limits the efficiency of
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* blinding and leaks information through side channels. For
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* secure behavior use mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() instead.
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*
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* (Optimally the blinding is a random value that is different
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* on every execution. In this case the blinding is still
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* random from the attackers perspective, but is the same on
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* each execution. This means that this blinding does not
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* prevent attackers from recovering secrets by combining
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* several measurement traces, but may prevent some attacks
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* that exploit relationships between secret data.)
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*
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* \param grp The ECP group.
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* \param r The first output integer.
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* \param s The second output integer.
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@@ -127,9 +141,56 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
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*
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* \see ecp.h
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*/
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int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
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const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
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mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
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int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
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mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
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const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
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mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
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/**
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* \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
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* previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
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*
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* For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
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* Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
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* Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
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*
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* \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
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* bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
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* defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
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* (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
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* 4.1.3, step 5.
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*
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* \see ecp.h
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*
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* \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
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* This must be initialized and have group parameters
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* set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
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* \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
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* the signature. This must be initialized.
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* \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
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* the signature. This must be initialized.
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* \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
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* and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
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* \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
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* buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
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* \p blen is zero.
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* \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
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* \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
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* \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
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* \c NULL.
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* \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
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* \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
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*
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* \return \c 0 on success.
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* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
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* error code on failure.
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*/
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int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
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mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
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const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
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mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
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int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
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size_t),
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void *p_rng_blind );
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
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/**
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@@ -601,6 +601,22 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_po
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*/
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int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d );
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/**
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* \brief Generate a private key
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*
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* \param grp ECP group
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* \param d Destination MPI (secret part)
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* \param f_rng RNG function
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* \param p_rng RNG parameter
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*
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* \return 0 if successful,
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* or a MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
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*/
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int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
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mbedtls_mpi *d,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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void *p_rng );
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/**
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* \brief Generate a keypair with configurable base point
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*
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