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SECURITY.md: make x509 data section more readable
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
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SECURITY.md
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SECURITY.md
@@ -108,15 +108,18 @@ protection against a class of attacks outside of the above described threat
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model. Neither does it mean that the failure of such a countermeasure is
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considered a vulnerability.
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#### Formatting of X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests
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#### Formatting of X509 data
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When parsing X.509 certificates, certificate signing requests (CSRs) or
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certificate revocation lists (CRLs) Mbed TLS does not check that they are
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strictly compliant with X.509 and other relevant standards. In the case of
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signed certificates and signed CRLs, the signing party is assumed to have
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performed this validation (and the certificate or CRL is trusted to be correctly
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formatted as long as the signature is correct). Similarly, CSRs are implicitly
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trusted by Mbed TLS to be standards-compliant.
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This section discusses limitations in how X.509 objects are processed. This
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applies to certificates, certificate signing requests (CSRs) and certificate
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revocation lists (CRLs).
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Mbed TLS does not check that they are strictly compliant with X.509 and other
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relevant standards. In the case of signed certificates and signed CRLs, the
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signing party is assumed to have performed this validation (and the certificate
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or CRL is trusted to be correctly formatted as long as the signature is
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correct). Similarly, CSRs are implicitly trusted by Mbed TLS to be
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standards-compliant.
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**Warning!** Mbed TLS must not be used to sign untrusted CSRs or CRLs unless
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extra validation is performed separately to ensure that they are compliant to
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