diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data index 03dd6c8222..ba3797eca2 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.data @@ -104,6 +104,18 @@ PSA external RNG failure: RSA PKCS#1v1.5 (software implementation) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN external_rng_failure_sign:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:32 +PSA RNG after fork: parent gets random never +psa_rng_fork:-1 + +PSA RNG after fork: parent gets random before +psa_rng_fork:0 + +PSA RNG after fork: parent gets random between +psa_rng_fork:1 + +PSA RNG after fork: parent gets random after +psa_rng_fork:2 + PSA validate entropy injection: good, minimum size validate_entropy_seed_injection:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function index 413e1ea5d8..5b0bba3cb7 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_entropy.function @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ #include #include +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE) +#include +#endif + #include /* Some tests in this module configure entropy sources. */ @@ -149,6 +153,20 @@ exit: } #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +static void child_psa_get_random(void *param, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + (void) param; + PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_random(output, output_size)); + *output_length = output_size; +exit: + ; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE && !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + /* Calculating the minimum allowed entropy size in bytes */ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY_MIN_SIZE MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, \ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) @@ -662,6 +680,81 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG:MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_UNIXLIKE */ +/* Test that if a program calls fork(), the PSA RNG returns different byte + * sequences in each child process, and that they're different from the + * parent process. + * + * The argument parent_when controls when the parent calls + * psa_generate_random(): -1 = never, 0 = before forking, >0 = after forking + * that many children. + * + * Note that passing tests don't mean that everything is fine, they only + * mean that things are not too obviously broken. It's possible to badly + * design the RNG so that, for example, different child processes will + * have the same RNG output sequence but at an offset, or so that a child + * process's RNG is seeded from RNG output of the parent (making it + * predictable if an adversary happens to be able to get the right chunk + * of RNG output from th parent), or different sequencing of forking + * grand^n-children ends up with them having identical RNG output sequences. + * These bad designs are practically impossible to detect through testing, + * and must be excluded by human reasoning on the RNG design. + */ +void psa_rng_fork(int parent_when) +{ + struct { + /* We read 16 bytes from the RNG. This is large enough so that the + * probability of a coincidence is negligible, and small enough that + * the RNG won't spontaneously decide reseed to unless it has + * prediction resistance. */ + unsigned char rng_output[16]; + } child[2], parent; + memset(child, 0, sizeof(child)); + memset(&parent, 0, sizeof(parent)); + + PSA_INIT(); + + /* Create some child processes, have them generate random data + * and report that data back to the original process. */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(child); i++) { + mbedtls_test_set_step(i); + if ((size_t) parent_when == i) { + PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_random(parent.rng_output, + sizeof(parent.rng_output))); + } + size_t length; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_fork_run_child( + child_psa_get_random, NULL, + child[i].rng_output, sizeof(child[i].rng_output), + &length), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(length, sizeof(child[i].rng_output)); + } + + if (parent_when == ARRAY_LENGTH(child)) { + PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_random(parent.rng_output, + sizeof(parent.rng_output))); + } + + /* Did the children have different RNG states? */ + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(child[0].rng_output, + child[1].rng_output, + sizeof(parent.rng_output)) != 0); + /* If parent_when >= 0: did the children have different RNG states + * from the parent? + * If parent_when < 0: did the children get nonzero RNG output? + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(child); i++) { + mbedtls_test_set_step(i); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(parent.rng_output, + child[i].rng_output, + sizeof(parent.rng_output)) != 0); + } + +exit: + PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ void validate_entropy_seed_injection(int seed_length_a, int expected_status_a,