Now that Base64 validates the number of trailing equals, adjust the PEM test
case that has a Base64 payload with a wrong number of trailing equals, where
`mbedtls_pem_read_buffer()` now returns a different error code. I'm not sure
what the exact intent of the test was, so add a variant with trailing equals
as well.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Correct base64 input (excluding ignored characters such as spaces) consists
of exactly 4*k, 4*k-1 or 4*k-2 digits, followed by 0, 1 or 2 equal signs
respectively.
Previously, any number of trailing equal signs up to 2 was accepted, but if
there fewer than 4*k digits-or-equals, the last partial block was counted in
`*olen` in buffer-too-small mode, but was not output despite returning 0.
Now `mbedtls_base64_decode()` insists on correct padding. This is
backward-compatible since the only plausible useful inputs that used to be
accepted were inputs with 4*k-1 or 4*k-2 digits and no trailing equal signs,
and those led to invalid (truncated) output. Furthermore the function now
always reports the exact output size in buffer-too-small mode.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Add unit tests covering cases where the number of digits plus equal signs is
not a multiple of 4. These are invalid inputs, but they are currently
accepted as long as the number of equal signs is at most 2.
The tests assert the current behavior, not behavior that is desirable.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Reinforce the unit test for `mbedtls_base64_decode()` with valid inputs to
systematically call the function with a smaller output buffer and with an
empty output buffer. Assert the reported necessary output length in those
cases.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
I'm just trying to have a shorter name to avoid repeating a long
expression. This is a job for a pointer, not copying a struct.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This version is incomplete. I failed to noticed it when adding a more
complete version, making the existing one redundant.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
That memory leak had been present ever since the san command-line
argument has been added.
Tested that the following invocation is now fully valgrind clean:
programs/x509/cert_write san=DN:C=NL,CN=#0000,CN=foo;DN:CN=#0000,O=foo,OU=bar,C=UK;IP:1.2.3.4;IP:4.3.2.1;URI:http\\://example.org/;URI:foo;DNS:foo.example.org;DNS:bar.example.org
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The runtime error was introduced two commits ago (while avoiding a
use-after-free). Now the programs run cleanly but still leak memory.
The memory leak is long pre-existing and larger than just DN components
(which are made temporarily slightly worse by this commit) and will be
fixed properly in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The documentation doesn't say you can't call these functions more than
once on the same context, and if you do it shouldn't result in a memory
leak. Historically, the call to mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list() in
mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() (that was removed in the previous commit)
was ensuring that. Let's restore it where it makes sense. (These are the
only 3 places calling mbedtls_x509_string_to_names() in the library.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Now programs/x509/cert_write san="DN:CN=#0000;DN:CN=#0000" is no longer
crashing with use-after-free, instead it's now failing cleanly:
failed
! mbedtls_x509_string_to_names returned -0x2800 - X509 - Input invalid
That's better of course but still not great, will be fixed by future
commits.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This structure is initialized during the compilation and there is no
reason it changes.
Making it const allows the compiler to put it in .rodata section instead
of .data one.
Signed-off-by: Xavier Chapron <chapron.xavier@gmail.com>
Previously, the length of the label was limited to the maximal length
that would be used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. With the keying material
exporter, labels of up to 249 bytes may be used.
Signed-off-by: Max Fillinger <maximilian.fillinger@foxcrypto.com>
