* mbedtls-2.16-restricted:
Add changelog entry for session copy bugfix
[session] fix a session copy bug fix a possible double reference on 'ticket' when peer_cert/peer_cert_digest calloc failed.
Zeroize temporary buffers used to sanity-check the signature.
If there is an error, overwrite the tentative signature in the output
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Check the return values of mbedtls_md_xx functions in our code. We were
already doing that everywhere for hash calculations, but not for HMAC
calculations.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Zeroize local MAC variables used for CBC+HMAC cipher suites. In encryption,
this is just good hygiene but probably not needed for security since the
data protected by the MAC that could leak is about to be transmitted anyway.
In DTLS decryption, this could be a security issue since an adversary could
learn the MAC of data that they were trying to inject. At least with
encrypt-then-MAC, the adversary could then easily inject a datagram with
a corrected packet. TLS would still be safe since the receiver would close
the connection after the bad MAC.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Previously passing a NULL or zero length password into either
mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe() or mbedtls_pkcs12_derive() could cause an infinate
loop, and it was also possible to pass a NULL password, with a non-zero
length, which would cause memory corruption.
I have fixed these errors, and improved the documentation to reflect the
changes and further explain what is expected of the inputs.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
This is a workaround for an issue with mkstemp() in older MinGW releases that
causes simultaneous creation of .a files in the same directory to fail.
Fixes#5146
Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Warning reported with IAR compiler:
"mbedtls\library\pkparse.c",1167 Warning[Pe550]: variable "ret" was set but never used
Signed-off-by: Kenneth Soerensen <knnthsrnsn@gmail.com>
A DES or AES block operation can fail in alternative implementations of
mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt() (under MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT),
mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt() (under MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT),
mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb() (under MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT),
mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb() (under MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT).
A failure can happen if the accelerator peripheral is in a bad state.
Several block modes were not catching the error.
This commit does the following code changes:
* Fix DES and AES API calls which ignored the return values:
* In library code: on failure, goto exit and return ret.
* In pkey programs: goto exit.
* In the benchmark program: exit (not ideal since there's no error
message, but it's what the code currently does for failures).
* In test code: TEST_ASSERT.
* Changelog entry.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Starzyk <mateusz.starzyk@mobica.com>
To test c <= high, instead of testing the sign of (high + 1) - c, negate the
sign of high - c (as we're doing for c - low). This is a little easier to
read and shaves 2 instructions off the arm thumb build with
arm-none-eabi-gcc 7.3.1.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
n was used for two different purposes. Give it a different name the second
time. This does not seem to change the generated code when compiling with
optimization for size or performance.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Instead of doing constant-flow table lookup, which requires 64 memory loads
for each lookup into a 64-entry table, do a range-based calculation, which
requires more CPU instructions per range but there are only 5 ranges.
I expect a significant performance gain (although smaller than for decoding
since the encoding table is half the size), but I haven't measured. Code
size is slightly smaller.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Document what each local variable does when it isn't obvious from the name.
Don't reuse a variable for different purposes.
This commit has very little impact on the generated code (same code size on
a sample Thumb build), although it does fix a theoretical bug that 2^32
spaces inside a line would be ignored instead of treated as an error.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Instead of doing constant-flow table lookup, which requires 128 memory loads
for each lookup into a 128-entry table, do a range-based calculation, which
requires more CPU instructions per range but there are only 5 ranges.
Experimentally, this is ~12x faster on my PC (based on
programs/x509/load_roots). The code is slightly smaller, too.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Base64 decoding uses equality comparison tests for characters that don't
leak information about the content of the data other than its length, such
as whitespace. Do this with '=' as well, since it only reveals information
about the length. This way the table lookup can focus on character validity
and decoding value.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The function `pk_hashlen_helper` exists to ensure a valid hash_len is
used in pk_verify and pk_sign functions. This function has been
used to adjust to the corrsponding hash_len if the user passes in 0
for the hash_len argument based on the md algorithm given. If the user
does not pass in 0 as the hash_len, then it is not adjusted. This is
problematic if the user gives a hash_len and hash buffer that is less than the
associated length of the md algorithm. This error would go unchecked
and eventually lead to buffer overread when given to specific pk_sign/verify
functions, since they both ignore the hash_len argument if md_alg is not
MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
This commit, adds a conditional to `pk_hashlen_helper` so that an
error is thrown if the user specifies a hash_length (not 0) and it is
less than the expected for the associated message digest algorithm.
This aligns better with the api documentation where it states "If
hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg is used instead,
or an error returned if it is invalid"
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
These macros were moved into a header and now check-names.sh is failing.
Add an MBEDTLS_ prefix to the macro names to make it pass.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
We were already rejecting them at the end, due to the fact that with the
usual (x, z) formulas they lead to the result (0, 0) so when we want to
normalize at the end, trying to compute the modular inverse of z will
give an error.
If we wanted to support those points, we'd a special case in
ecp_normalize_mxz(). But it's actually permitted by all sources (RFC
7748 say we MAY reject 0 as a result) and recommended by some to reject
those points (either to ensure contributory behaviour, or to protect
against timing attack when the underlying field arithmetic is not
constant-time).
Since our field arithmetic is indeed not constant-time, let's reject
those points before they get mixed with sensitive data (in
ecp_mul_mxz()), in order to avoid exploitable leaks caused by the
special cases they would trigger. (See the "May the Fourth" paper
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf)
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
