Files
mbedtls/library
Hanno Becker 63c706f429 Fix bounds check in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint()
In the previous bounds check `(*p) > end - len`, the computation
of `end - len` might underflow if `end` is within the first 64KB
of the address space (note that the length `len` is controlled by
the peer). In this case, the bounds check will be bypassed, leading
to `*p` exceed the message bounds by up to 64KB when leaving
`ssl_parse_server_psk_hint()`. In a pure PSK-based handshake,
this doesn't seem to have any consequences, as `*p*` is not accessed
afterwards. In a PSK-(EC)DHE handshake, however, `*p` is read from
in `ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params()` and `ssl_parse_server_dh_params()`
which might lead to an application crash of information leakage.
2018-10-08 13:53:51 +01:00
..
2018-03-09 10:48:12 +00:00
2017-07-27 21:44:33 +01:00
2017-09-06 17:51:14 +03:00
2017-10-10 19:04:27 +03:00
2018-03-30 18:52:10 +02:00
2018-02-22 08:20:42 +00:00
2018-02-22 08:20:42 +00:00
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
2018-05-25 14:58:33 +01:00
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
2017-10-29 17:53:52 +02:00
2018-01-29 10:24:50 +01:00
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00
2018-06-22 11:45:38 +01:00
2018-07-02 12:13:26 +01:00
2015-09-04 14:21:07 +02:00