Files
mbedtls/library
Hanno Becker bab079e85e Fix bounds check in ssl_parse_server_psk_hint()
In the previous bounds check `(*p) > end - len`, the computation
of `end - len` might underflow if `end` is within the first 64KB
of the address space (note that the length `len` is controlled by
the peer). In this case, the bounds check will be bypassed, leading
to `*p` exceed the message bounds by up to 64KB when leaving
`ssl_parse_server_psk_hint()`. In a pure PSK-based handshake,
this doesn't seem to have any consequences, as `*p*` is not accessed
afterwards. In a PSK-(EC)DHE handshake, however, `*p` is read from
in `ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params()` and `ssl_parse_server_dh_params()`
which might lead to an application crash of information leakage.
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