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Merge pull request #10567 from yanesca/add_clarifications_4.x

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Add miscellaneous clarifications
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David Horstmann
2026-01-20 16:38:53 +00:00
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parent 069cfbd43c 2b9f62a1be
commit 7294fc1c1a
2 changed files with 17 additions and 11 deletions
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26
SECURITY.md
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@@ -108,21 +108,25 @@ protection against a class of attacks outside of the above described threat
model. Neither does it mean that the failure of such a countermeasure is
considered a vulnerability.
#### Formatting of X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests
#### Formatting of X509 data
This section discusses limitations in how X.509 objects are processed. This
applies to certificates, certificate signing requests (CSRs) and certificate
revocation lists (CRLs).
When parsing X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests (CSRs),
Mbed TLS does not check that they are strictly compliant with X.509 and other
relevant standards. In the case of signed certificates, the signing party is
assumed to have performed this validation (and the certificate is trusted to
be correctly formatted as long as the signature is correct).
Similarly, CSRs are implicitly trusted by Mbed TLS to be standards-compliant.
relevant standards. In the case of signed certificates and signed CRLs, the
signing party is assumed to have performed this validation (and the certificate
or CRL is trusted to be correctly formatted as long as the signature is
correct). Similarly, CSRs are implicitly trusted by Mbed TLS to be
standards-compliant.
**Warning!** Mbed TLS must not be used to sign untrusted CSRs unless extra
validation is performed separately to ensure that they are compliant to the
relevant specifications. This makes Mbed TLS on its own unsuitable for use in
a Certificate Authority (CA).
**Warning!** Mbed TLS must not be used to sign untrusted CSRs or CRLs unless
extra validation is performed separately to ensure that they are compliant to
the relevant specifications. This makes Mbed TLS on its own unsuitable for use
in a Certificate Authority (CA).
However, Mbed TLS aims to protect against memory corruption and other
undefined behavior when parsing certificates and CSRs. If a CSR or signed
undefined behavior when parsing certificates, CSRs and CRLs. If a CSR or signed
certificate causes undefined behavior when it is parsed by Mbed TLS, that
is considered a security vulnerability.

2
programs/README.md
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@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ Mbed TLS sample programs
This subdirectory mostly contains sample programs that illustrate specific features of the library, as well as a few test and support programs.
We try to ensure that the sample programs are good examples of how to use Mbed TLS but we make no hard guarantees about their security. They should not be used in production unless they have been separately tested and thoroughly audited for security. Note that this means vulnerabilities in the sample programs are out of the scope of our usual security process and will be fixed in public.
### SSL/TLS sample applications
* [`ssl/dtls_client.c`](ssl/dtls_client.c): a simple DTLS client program, which sends one datagram to the server and reads one datagram in response.