Bump the version number in pkgconfig/CMakeLists.txt so the package
config files stay in sync with the project VERSION.
This is Related to:
- aa4862a5e ("Bump the version number in CMakeLists.txt")
But changes were made to support CMake prior to version 3.0.
Signed-off-by: Bill Roberts <bill.roberts@arm.com>
Add three package config files for mbedtls, mbedcrypto and mbedx509.
Also update various project variables so the generated PC files have the
required data needed without hardcoding it everywhere.
This will help distros package the project following existing
conventsions between a normal and -devel package that includes the
headers and .pc files for pkg-config aware consumers.
This also squashes:
- fff51cecc ("Update ChangeLog.d/pkg-config-files-addition.txt")
Fixes: #228
Signed-off-by: Bill Roberts <bill.roberts@arm.com>
Add non-regression tests. Update some test functions to not assume that
byte_length == bit_length / 8.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Upon further consideration we think that a remote attacker close to the
victim might be able to have precise enough timing information to
exploit the side channel as well. Update the Changelog to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
The signature and naming of the Montgomrey initialisation function in
development and in the LTS was different. Align them for easier
readability and maintenance.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
Any timing variance dependant on the output of this function enables a
Bleichenbacher attack. It is extremely difficult to use safely.
In the Marvin attack paper
(https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/marvin-attack-paper.pdf) the
author suggests that implementations of PKCS 1.5 decryption that don't
include a countermeasure should be considered inherently dangerous.
They suggest that all libraries implement the same countermeasure, as
implementing different countermeasures across libraries enables the
Bleichenbacher attack as well.
This is extremely fragile and therefore we don't implement it. The use
of PKCS 1.5 in Mbed TLS implements the countermeasures recommended in
the TLS standard (7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246) and is not vulnerable.
Add a warning to PKCS 1.5 decryption to warn users about this.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
So far we needed it only locally here, but we will need calculating RR
for safe unblinding in RSA as well.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
secp224k1 is the one with 225-bit private keys.
The consequences of this mistake were:
* We emitted positive test cases for hypothetical SECP_R1_225 and
SECP_K1_224 curves, which were never executed.
* We emitted useless not-supported test cases for SECP_R1_225 and SECP_K1_224.
* We were missing positive test cases for SECP_R1_224 in automatically
generated tests.
* We were missing not-supported test cases for SECP_R1_224 and SECP_K1_225.
Thus this didn't cause test failures, but it caused missing test coverage
and some never-executed test cases.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
